World Health Organisation received notification of a cluster of severe respiratory illness aboard the MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship carrying 147 passengers and crew from 23 different countries. By 8 May, the WHO had confirmed eight cases of Hantavirus infection, including three deaths. The responsible Andes virus strain has demonstrated limited but documented capacity for human-to-human transmission through close, prolonged contact. Countries from Singapore to Canada to France are currently tracing contacts and isolating suspected cases.
The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) has confirmed that, as of today, there are no recorded Hantavirus cases in Nigeria. That is the good news. The harder question that Connected Development (CODE) is raising is whether that window of safety is the result of strong epidemic preparedness systems, or simply of good fortune. Based on the evidence our programmes have gathered, we believe it is largely the latter.
Nigeria’s Port Health Services cover five international airports and five seaports. Official documentation of those services names a shortage of officers at screening points and inadequate quarantine facilities as standing challenges. These are not allegations, as they are recorded institutional admissions. At the peak of COVID-19, Nigeria tested approximately 1.78 million samples by mid-2021. South Africa, a country with a smaller population, tested 3.2 million over the same period. The gap in testing and contact-tracing capacity that the pandemic exposed has not been structurally resolved.
Through the COVID-19 Transparency and Accountability Project (CTAP), CODE tracked the management of public funds raised for Nigeria’s pandemic response. More than ₦99 billion and millions of dollars in documented donations were received from individuals, domestic organisations, and international partners. A National Bureau of Statistics survey found that by July 2020, only 12.5 percent of the poorest quintile of Nigerians had received any form of assistance since the pandemic began. Civil society organisations described Nigeria’s COVID-19 fund management as lacking a framework for accountability. Spending was, in their words, shrouded in secrecy.
These facts matter now because the federal government is currently disbursing ₦32.9 billion under the revised BHCPF 2.0 framework, money intended to reach over 8,000 primary health centres, with epidemic preparedness financing flowing specifically through the NCDC gateway. The NCDC gateway is the only channel within the Basic Health Care Provision Fund that directly funds disease surveillance, outbreak response, laboratory systems, and emergency coordination. Despite the governance improvements introduced under BHCPF 2.0 in October 2025, public visibility into NCDC gateway disbursements and utilisation remains limited. CODE’s Project Track BHCPF (#HealthShield), a structured accountability and evidence project applying our Follow The Money methodology, Freedom of Information requests, and sub-national case studies, exists precisely to close that gap.
During a recent Follow The Money engagement on Project Track BHCPF (#HealthShield), a serving State Epidemiologist confirmed on record that bureaucracy, knowledge gaps among stakeholders, and weak coordination systems are slowing state-level access to health emergency preparedness funds, even where national-level funds are available. This is the infrastructure gap that exists between a government disbursement and an equipped frontline worker. It is the gap that kills people when an outbreak arrives faster than the system can respond.
CODE calls on the Federal Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the NCDC, the Nigerian Port Authority, the Ministry of Aviation, and all relevant agencies to immediately conduct and publish a transparent audit of disease surveillance and quarantine capacity at all points of entry, and to ensure that BHCPF NCDC gateway disbursements for epidemic preparedness are publicly reported and traceable to frontline outcomes. Inter-agency coordination between the NCDC, NPHCDA, immigration services, and port health services must be strengthened as a standing mechanism, not an emergency assembly convened only when an outbreak has already arrived. Frontline health personnel at all international airports and seaports must be adequately equipped and deployed, and a public awareness response on Hantavirus must be activated that is proportionate, accurate, and designed to prevent the kind of misinformation that severely undermined Nigeria’s early COVID-19 response.
Nigeria is at a point where proactive investment in surveillance, preparedness, and frontline health systems can prevent future crises. The cost of prevention is far lower than the cost of emergency response after outbreaks spiral beyond control. Nigeria has a window. The time to use it is now.
Signed,
Hyeladzira Mshelia
Acting Chief Executive, CODE
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