By K.P. NWODO
As Nigeria races towards another election cycle, political machineries are currently being oiled and the engine of intense politicking ignited, ahead of a long, arduous journey to power in 2027. The last few weeks have been a spectacle; a demonstration of the cinematic, blockbuster dimension of politics in Nigeria.
We have witnessed unexpected defections of key political actors across different political parties, surprising alignments, uncurling of previous alignments, court decisions that have foisted more uncertainty than clarity amongst political parties caught in a web of internal bickering, and headline outcomes from screening exercises in some political parties. As the clock clicks and time moves on a skate, political parties are keen on meeting INEC’s timeline for the conduct of primaries, and politicians twitchy about their ambitions being prematurely interred at the primaries.
Unlike previous cycles where politicians enjoyed the liberty of jumping ship to another political party when they find themselves on the losing side of a primary, the current dispensation heralded by the 2026 Electoral Act appears to have to have terminated that practice. Vanquished politicians are pink-slipped doors shut, and windows sealed for politicians looking to jump out to explore their ambitions elsewhere; or supposedly so. This broad conclusion is inferred from an interpretation of Section 77 of the Electoral Act (as amended 2026), and at first glance, it appears unassailable.
But appearances can be deceptive.
This article does not dispute the logic of that conclusion. Rather, it interrogates its completeness. A careful reading of Section 77 alongside other relevant provisions of the Act reveals that the bar against post-primary decamping is not as absolute as widely assumed. The restriction, properly construed, operates within a narrower lane than the popular narrative suggests. It is against this backdrop that a closer legal examination becomes necessary. Precisely, to interrogate whether the much-cited Section 77 of the Electoral Act (as amended 2026) achieves the ironclad effect that most commentators and politicians have assumed it does.
The Legal Framework — An Overview
As previously mentioned, the thrust of this issue orbits around the provision of Section 77 of the Electoral Act, precisely subsections 4-7 which are reproduced below:
(4) “Each political party shall make such register available to the Commission not
later than 21 days before the date fixed for the party primaries, congresses or
conventions.
(5) Only members whose names are contained in the register shall be eligible to vote and be voted for in party primaries, congresses and conventions.
(6) A political party shall not use any other register for party primaries, congresses
and conventions except the register submitted to the Commission.
(7) A party that fails to submit the membership register within the stipulated time
shall not be eligible to field a candidate for that election.”
In the context of this article, the above provisions simply stipulate that political parties are statutorily mandated to use the registers submitted to INEC for primaries. The legislative intention deductible from the framing of the provisions is the preclusion of post-primary defection and the elimination of the itinerant culture of certain politicians in desperate search of party tickets to contest general elections. Under the current framework, the legal and practical effect for a decamping aspirant is bleak. It implies that having participated in the primary of Party A and lost, any defection to Party B would almost certainly come after Party B’s register has already been submitted to INEC, making the aspirant’s name conspicuously absent from it and therefore unqualified to participate in its primary.
This is where the analysis gets interesting. While the intention objectively appears noble, and the text at first glance seems comprehensively drafted leaving no crevice or lacunae for exploitation; upon further scrutiny, microscopic cracks begin to unravel.
A careful reading reveals that every operative restriction in Section 77 — from the register submission requirement to the eligibility criteria for participation — is expressly and exclusively tied to party primaries. The section speaks of registers for primaries, eligibility to vote and be voted for in primaries, and the prohibition against alternative registers for primaries. Nowhere does the section extend these restrictions to the other legally recognized method of candidate emergence under the Act: the consensus arrangement.
If the National Assembly intended to cloth primaries and consensus arrangements with same legal identity, it would have made it clear beyond speculation or equivocation. Our courts have reiterated numerously “that courts are not to speculate on the intentions of the legislature but must give effect to the clear and unambiguous language of a statute as enacted” SEE Ekeocha v. Civil Service Commission (1981) 1 N.C.L.R. 401.
